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ARGUMENT 
The brief filed by the Defendants/Appellees (hereinafter referred to as "Medicine") 
does not raise any legal issue not already adequately addressed by Plaintiff/Appellant 
(hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation"), but it does create misrepresentations of fact. 
In this regard and in its tone, the brief requires a reply. After reading it, one is left with 
the distinct impression that it is a classic example of an old adage. If you have no law or 
facts which support your position, wear a dark suit, manipulate what facts you do have 
and insult the opposing party and its attorneys. 
To refocus this court on the real issues in this matter, and to clarify misstatements 
in Medicine's brief, Rehabilitation offers the following summary and clarification. 
1. Rehabilitation appreciates Medicine pointing out that a key phrase was 
inadvertently omitted from the quote of paragraph 11 in Rehabilitation's Brief. This point 
is, however, meaningless as the Termination Agreement is attached as an addendum, and 
it is clear that the entire brief is dedicated to the issue of whether the ownership of the 
name was transferred. Rehabilitation apologizes to the court if the omission caused any 
confusion. It clearly does not affect the substance of the appeal or the brief. 
1 
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2. To clarify the statement of the issue on appeal, the issue is not, as Medicine 
would have the court believe, whether summary judgment was appropriate where it is ( 
"undisputed" that the name "Sports Medicine Center" was not sold to the joint venture. If 
this were the issue, we would not be before this court. The issue is whether the name was . 
sold to the joint venture, despite the fact that it was not expressly referred to in the 
documents. Rehabilitation admits the name is not expressly referred to in the documents 
i 
which encompass the sale of the Sports Medicine Center to the joint venture, but that is 
all that is "undisputed". 
3. Medicine repeatedly alleges that Rehabilitation cites no law in support of its * 
position or that the law which is cited is misapplied. Contrary to these allegations, this 
matter does not present complex issues of law. Rehabilitation stands by the law it cited in . 
its original brief and its application. The cases of Southern Utah Mortuary v. Olpin 776 
P.2d 945 (Utah App 1989) and Sorensen v. Sorensen 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989) 
clearly stand for the proposition that goodwill need not be expressly listed to be included 
as an asset of a business being sold and that recognition of a name is an element of 
goodwill. This holding supports Rehabilitations contention that the name need not have 
been listed in order for the court to conclude it was in fact sold. 
2 
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4. Despite Medicine's protestations to the contrary, the issue of whether the name 
was sold was raised for the first time in the Motion for Summary Judgment, the granting 
of which is currently on appeal. Medicine cites the record at page 174 for its assertion 
that the issue of whether the name was sold was addressed in the first motion for 
summary judgment back in 1993. The citation does not support the argument. Instead, it 
is clear from the record at page 174 that the only issue in the first summary judgment was 
whether "all" or only a portion of the assets listed in paragraph 11 were sold. Nowhere is 
the sale of the name singled out as a separate issue. 
5. This misstatement of the substance of the first motion is at the heart of 
Medicine's argument that Rehabilitation had the opportunity to conduct "complete 
discovery" prior to the entry of summary judgment. Contrary to this assertion, 
Rehabilitation did not have this opportunity. The misstatement is also problematic in that 
Medicine goes on to list what evidence Rehabilitation has not produced and implies that 
Rehabilitation cannot produce it because it does not exist. To argue that Rehabilitation 
has no evidence of the use of the name "in [the joint venture's] business operations, in 
advertising, billing patients, business letterhead, or in any ordinary business transactions" 
is not the same as being able to argue evidence that Medicine in fact did none of these 
3 
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things. (And, what is the continued use of a name on a building if not "advertising" and 
"ordinary business operations"?) At the very least, Rehabilitation should have been given < 
time to conduct "complete discovery" on a brand new issue. 
6. Medicine presents other "facts" in such a way to create an erroneous 
impression. In paragraph 12 on page 7, Medicine states that the joint venture moved 
from the 3900 South location "[a]fter the IHC transaction closed". While technically true, 
i 
this creates the impression that the move was shortly after the closing, and this impression 
is false. The joint venture did not move from 3900 South until after this lawsuit was filed 
and until after the name was changed in response to the suit, which time was well in * 
excess of eighteen months after the closing. w 
7. In opposition to Rehabilitation's argument that no asset was excluded from the ' 
sale, Medicine argues that to "enumerate [assets] is to exclude"them under Utah law. 
However, this argument ignores the plain language of the joint venture documents. 
I 
Whenever assets at issue in this case are enumerated by the parties to the joint venture 
documents, the language used describes that the sale encompasses "all" of the Center's 
assets, "including without limitation" those items enumerated. Giving this language its 
plain meaning, it, negates Medicine's argument in this regard. 
4 
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8. In response to Rehabilitation's argument that the ruling at issue was beyond the 
scope of the previous remand, Medicine argues that the remand was only dicta and that it 
is non-binding. Contrary to Medicine's argument, in the initial appeal, Rehabilitation 
requested that this court not only vacate the summary judgment in Medicine's favor, but 
also that this court enter summary judgment in Rehabilitation's favor, remanding only the 
issue of the amount to which Rehabilitation was entitled. (See pages 31-33 of the Brief 
of Appellant filed in the first appeal, a copy of which is attached in addendum 1 to this 
brief for convenient reference) This court refused to do so on the basis that there 
remained one factual dispute, resolution of which was necessary to establish liability. 
Therefore, the issue was not "collateral" or otherwise a statement simply made in passing. 
It was decided "in actuality" and "by necessary implication". D'Aston v. D'Aston 844 
P.2d 345 (Utah App 1992). Medicine's due process rights cannot be deemed violated 
where Medicine had full opportunity to raise the issue from the time suit was filed in 
1991 through an appeal finally decided in 1995 and through a subsequent Request for 
Rehearing and a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The summary judgment is clearly subject 
to being stricken as beyond the scope of this court's remand. 
5 
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CONCLUSION 
Should this court decide that the lower court did not exceed the scope of its I 
remand, then on appeal of summary judgment, this court must review the facts in the light 
most favorable to Rehabilitation as the non-moving party. (See. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
i 
County 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993) and Clover v. Snowbird Ski terorf 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 
(Utah 1991)). Medicine and Rehabilitation entered into a Termination Agreement which 
recognizes that Rehabilitation had an interest in the goodwill of the Sports Medicine 
Center. Medicine entered into a transaction within the two year time period referred to in 
the Termination Agreement, and this court has ruled that the sale of the assets was a sale i 
of "all", not one-half of the assets. Now, the issue has become whether the ownership of 
the name was transferred to the joint venture as part of the sale of "all". 
The lower court ruled that, since it was not an asset expressly enumerated, the 
court could only find that it had not been sold. This ruling is in error as evidence in the 
record is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. This evidence includes: 
1) the joint venture sales documents themselves, which make it clear that the assets sold 
to the joint venture were "all" of the assets of the Center, "without limitation"; 2) an i 
affidavit submitted by Medicine itself which admits that the name was used at least four 
6 
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months after the sale; and 3) two affidavits submitted by Rehabilitation which include 
evidence that the name was not changed until this lawsuit was filed and that this suit was 
in fact the impetus for the change. At the very least, this evidence entitles Rehabilitation 
to conduct additional discovery on an issue raised for the first time in the motion at issue 
on appeal, despite the years of litigation in which these parties have been engaged. 
This court must reverse the Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and remand this matter for trial, once again with very specific instructions as to 
the scope of the issues remanded 
DATED this /S-^day of May, 1999. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
tiff/ Appellant 
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Based on the foregoing, and in the words of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Wineqar, summary judgment was simply not appropriate. 
Therefore this Court should reverse the lower court's orders and 
either grant Rehabilitation's Motion for Summary Judgment or remand 
the issues for trial. 
ARGUMENT III 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT EXIST WHICH PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT INAPPROPRIATE. 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment is appropriate only where "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." In addition, on appeal, the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. (See Hiqqins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).) Applying 
these principles to the facts of this case, it was inappropriate 
for the court to enter summary judgment. 
As outlined in the first argument of this brief, 
Rehabilitation believes that, as a matter of law, the transaction 
between the Appellees and IHC must be defined by an analysis of all 
of the documents executed by those parties on May 24, 1990. 
However, at the very least, the issue of the nature of the 
transaction is a factual issue. Rehabilitation should have been 
29 
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allowed to present evidence relating to the negotiations and the 
ultimate outcome of the IHC transaction. 
However, even under the courtfs interpretation of the 
Termination Agreement, there were two disputed issues of fact which 
should have precluded the court from granting summary judgment. 
The first issue is whether or not Sports Medicine West assumed 
complete operational control of the Center, and the second issue is 
whether the joint venture continued to operate the Center under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". Appellees argued that the 
joint venture did not assume complete operational control because 
Appellees themselves continued to operate the Center. 
Rehabilitation disagreed. One of the documents signed on May 24, 
1990 was a Management Agreement by and between Sports Medicine West 
as "Owner" and Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine as "Agent". The 
recitals state as follows: 
A. Owner is operating a rehabilitation business at 
two locations in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Business"). 
B. Agent has substantial experience and expertise 
in the planning, development, promotion and management of 
rehabilitation businesses, and has been engaged in the 
development, ownership and operation of the Business, all 
of which factors may be utilized to benefit the 
operations of the Business. 
C. Agent is desirous of entering into a management 
arrangement pursuant to which Agent would undertake the 
direction, supervision and performance of day-to-day 
management and business development activities of the 
Business, the implementation of management and financial 
systems and the recommendation and implementation of 
plans, budgets and other managements tools, under the 
r day-to-day direction of the Owner, in consideration for 
which Agent would be paid a management fee. 
30 
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D. Owner is willing to engage Agent to undertake 
those activities on behalf of Owner on certain terms and 
conditions set forth in the balance of this Management 
Agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) (See Management Agreement submitted for in 
camera review.) 
It is clear from the plain and ordinary meaning of this 
language that Sports Medicine West had assumed complete operational 
control, and Medicine was relegated to an agency status• 
Turning next to the second disputed issue, that of whether or 
not the Center continued to operate at the same location under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center", it was directly in 
dispute. Rehabilitation submitted evidence by way of the 
Affidavits of Greg Gardner and Doug Toole that in fact the Center 
did continue to operate at the same location under the same name 
until after Rehabilitation filed this law suit in October of 1991. 
(R. 235 and R. 241.) The Appellees denied this allegation and 
submitted the Affidavit of Gene Oaks. At paragraph 5, Mr. Oaks 
states that the name was changed approximately one year before 
Rehabilitation filed its law suit in October of 1991. (R. 272-73.) 
Because both of these issues are central to the definition of 
a "sale" as that term is defined in paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement, it was inappropriate for the court to grant summary 
judgment. Given these genuine issues of material fact, this Court 
should reverse the lower court's orders and remand this case for 
trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred as a mater of law in looking only to the 
Asset Purchase Agreement and failing to consider all of the 
documents executed by the Appellees and IHC on May 24, 1990 in 
determining the nature of that transaction. Had the court 
correctly considered all of the documents, it would have been clear 
as a matter of law that there had, been a "sale" as that term is 
defined in the Termination Agreement between the parties to this 
action. The court should have granted Rehabilitation's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and the parties should have been allowed to 
proceed to trial to determine the amount to which Rehabilitation is 
entitled. 
In addition, the court committed error by basing its ruling on 
an interpretation of the Termination Agreement not propounded by 
either party. (Although had the court properly considered all the 
documents by and between IHC and the Appellees, Rehabilitation 
would have prevailed under the court's interpretation as well.) At 
the very least, the court's interpretation created an ambiguity 
entitling the parties to submit parol evidence as to their intent. 
This ambiguity, together with other genuine issues of material fact 
should have prevented the court from entering summary judgment. 
This court should reverse the lower court's orders and grant 
Rehabilitation's Motion for Summary Judgment. The case must then 
be remanded for a determination of the amount to which 
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Rehabilitation is entitled. In the alternative, this court should 
reverse the lower court's orders and remand all issues for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of January, 1995. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
KIM/M. LflHN 
At^orne/s for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of January, 1995, I 
caused a "true and correct copy of the foregoing to be [ ] mailed, 
postage prepaid via U.S. Mail, [ x ] hand delivered to: 
Mark 0. Morris, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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